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PROTECTING THE FIFTH AMENDMENT:
THE RESIDUAL CLAUSE IN THE
MANDATORY GUIDELINES IS
VOID FOR VAGUENESS
OLIVIA M. TOURGEE†
INTRODUCTION
Before 2005, federal judges were mandated to compute a
criminal defendant’s sentence by following boilerplate,
mandatory sentencing Guidelines (the “Mandatory Guidelines”)
that often doubled or tripled the sentence once applied.1 For
instance, a defendant’s sentence could increase from four and one
half years to life,2 or from five years to 155 years.3 Judges had no
discretion to decrease the length or gravity of the sentence based
on ameliorating circumstances unique to the crime and
defendant at hand.4 Resulting sentences were thus often unjust.
The Mandatory Guidelines present constitutional concerns that
disrupt the very foundation of the American legal system: They
violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by failing to
provide notice to individuals and encouraging abritrary
enforcement by judges.5
Specifically, this Note focuses on defendants who were
eligible for a sentencing enhancement as a career offender under
the Mandatory Guidelines’ residual clause. Under United States
Sentencing Guideline § 4B1.1, a presiding judge was mandated to
apply a sentencing enhancement under the career offender
guideline if a defendant’s instant offense was a crime of violence

†
Notes and Comments Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2019, St.
John’s University School of Law; B.A., 2016, Fairfield University. With
overwhelming gratitude to the St. John’s Law Review editors and staffers for their
dedication and diligent efforts throughout the publication process. The author also
thanks her parents and sister for their unwavering love and support.
1
See, e.g., United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 361–62 (4th Cir. 2004) (en
banc) (Motz, J., dissenting); United States v. Rodriguez, 73 F.3d 161, 162–63 (7th
Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
2
Rodriguez, 73 F.3d at 162–63.
3
Hammoud, 381 F.3d at 361–62.
4
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233–34 (2005).
5
See infra Part III.A.
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and the defendant had at least two prior felony convictions that
qualify as crimes of violence.6 A crime of violence is defined
under United States Sentencing Guideline § 4B1.2(a)’s residual
clause as any offense punishable by imprisonment for over a year
that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential
risk of physical injury to another . . . .”7
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines have spurred much
debate, which has resulted in constant litigation and attention
from the federal courts. Independent of the judiciary, the United
States Sentencing Commission (the “Commission”) “establish[es]
sentencing policies and practices for the federal criminal justice
system that will assure the ends of justice by promulgating
detailed guidelines prescribing the appropriate sentences for
offenders convicted of federal crimes.”8 The Commission derives
this power from the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (the “Act”),
which “provides for the development of guidelines that will
further the basic purposes of criminal punishment: deterrence,
incapacitation, just punishment, and rehabilitation.”9
The
Commission sets guideline ranges for criminal acts based on a
collection of factors.10 The Act sought to effectuate a “fair
sentencing system” through honesty and uniformity in
sentencing.11 Appellate courts can review the trial courts’
sentencing decisions.12
6

Booker, 543 U.S. at 233–34 (Stevens, J., opinion of the Court). The career
offender guideline applies if:
(1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time the defendant
committed the instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense of
conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence . . . ; and (3) the
defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of . . . a crime of
violence . . . .
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1(a) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
7
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2009) (amended 2015). A crime of violence, in full, is defined as:
any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a
term exceeding one year, that— (1) has as an element the use, attempted
use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (2)
is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another.
Id.
8
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A1.1, introductory cmt. (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
9
Id. ch. 1, pt. A1.2.
10
Id.
11
Id. ch. 1, pt. A1.3. In addition, the Commission adopted a “departure policy,”
meaning that courts can depart from the guideline range, because “it is difficult to
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There are four Supreme Court decisions that are of
particular relevance to the discussion of Mandatory Guidelines.
First, the Court held in United States v. Booker that the
Mandatory Guidelines are unconstitutional, which rendered the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines as only advisory (the “Advisory
Guidelines”).13 Second, the Court in Johnson v. United States
(“Johnson II”), held that the Armed Criminal Career Act’s (the
“ACCA”) residual clause, which is identical to the residual clause
of the Mandatory Guidelines, is void for vagueness.14 Third, the
Court held in Beckles v. United States that the Advisory
Guidelines were not vulnerable to vagueness challenges.15 A
unique issue is now presented because there is no clear authority
on whether defendant-appellants sentenced under the
Mandatory Guidelines can bring a void-for-vagueness claim. In
fact, “[w]hether the Mandatory Guidelines are amenable to
vagueness challenges is an issue of first impression in [most]
circuit[s], and one that is sure to recur in light of Johnson [II]
and Beckles.”16 Fourth and finally, in Brown v. United States, the
Supreme Court recently denied certiorari to defendantappellants seeking to challenge the constitutionality of their
sentences imposed under the Mandatory Guidelines.17
Importantly, Justice Sotomayor, joined with Justice Ginsburg,
dissented from this denial of certiorari.18 The dissent outlined
many of the arguments discussed in this Note.
The first part of this Note will address the specific problem
the Mandatory Guidelines present.
First, the Mandatory
Guidelines will be defined, and the mandatory and binding
nature of these Mandatory Guidelines will be explored in depth.19
prescribe a single set of guidelines that encompasses the vast range of human
conduct potentially relevant to a sentencing decision.” Id. ch. 1, pt. A1.4(b).
12
Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2012).
13
543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (Breyer, J., opinion of the Court).
14
135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015); compare Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984,
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012), invalidated by Johnson v. United States, 135 S.
Ct. 2551 (2015) (“[T]he term ‘violent felony’ means any crime . . . that . . . otherwise
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another . . . .) with U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a)(2) (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2009) (amended 2015) ([T]he term ‘crime of violence’ means
any offense . . . that . . . otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential
risk of physical injury to another . . . .).
15
137 S. Ct. 886, 892 (2017).
16
United States v. Miller, 868 F.3d 1182, 1186–87 (10th Cir. 2017).
17
586 U.S. __ (2018).
18
Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
19
Booker, 543 U.S. at 233–35.
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Second, this Note will explain the significance of the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Booker that declared the Mandatory
Guidelines unconstitutional.20 Third, this Note will evaluate
Beckles, where the Supreme Court held that the Advisory
Guidelines were not subject to vagueness challenges.21 Thus, the
first part of this Note will set the stage for the problem that the
Mandatory Guidelines present.
The second part of this Note will discuss and provide a
solution to the constitutional issues presented by the Mandatory
Guidelines. First, defendant-appellants sentenced under the
Mandatory Guidelines should not be left without a path to
challenge the unconstitutionality of their sentences. Instead,
criminal defendants sentenced under the Mandatory Guidelines
should be able to challenge their sentences. In support of this
argument, this Note focuses on Johnson II, where the Supreme
Court held that the ACCA’s residual clause is void for
vagueness.22 The ACCA is not the same authority as the
Mandatory Guidelines; however, this Note argues that the
Mandatory Guidelines should be treated the same way as the
ACCA was in Johnson II because the residual clauses of each
authority have identical language.23
Second, allowing vagueness challenges to the Mandatory
Guidelines is a workable and constitutional solution to the grave
issue presented. Here, the Note will rely upon Welch v. United
States, where the Supreme Court held that Johnson II
announced a substantive rule that applies retroactively to cases
on collateral review.24 Following the first argument of this
section, defendant-appellants sentenced under the Mandatory
Guidelines should be able to raise their constitutional challenge
under Welch because the circumstances surrounding their
sentences are identical to those in the ACCA’s residual clause.
The third part of this Note comprises the four arguments in
favor of allowing vagueness challenges to the Mandatory
Guidelines.
First, the Mandatory Guidelines implicate
20

Id. at 244–45 (Breyer, J., opinion of the Court).
Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 892 (2017).
22
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015).
23
See, e.g., United States v. Sumrall, 690 F.3d 42, 42–43 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing
United States v. Jonas, 689 F.3d 83, 86 (1st Cir. 2012)).
24
Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (2016). This is important since
many defendant-appellants challenge their sentences by seeking leave to file a
second or successive motion to vacate their sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). See
infra Part II.B.
21
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vagueness due process concerns. Second, Johnson II and Beckles
permit vagueness challenges to the Mandatory Guidelines.
Third, the ACCA and the Mandatory Guidelines should be
treated identically because of their similar residual clauses.
Fourth, the Supreme Court has recognized a new rule applicable
to the Mandatory Guidelines. Accordingly, defendant-appellants
sentenced under the residual clause of the Mandatory Guidelines
should be able to challenge their sentences as void for vagueness.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Significance of the Mandatory Guidelines

The Mandatory Guidelines present many constitutional and
practical problems. First, judges had no discretion.25 The
Supreme Court held that judges did not have discretion under
the Mandatory Guidelines: “The Guidelines as written, however,
are not advisory; they are mandatory and binding on all
judges . . . . Because they are binding on judges, we have
consistently held that the Guidelines have the force and effect of
laws.”26 Although 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) states that the Mandatory
Guidelines were one factor to be considered in imposing a
sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) orders that a court “ ‘shall impose a
sentence of the kind, and within the range’ established by the
Guidelines, subject to departures in specific, limited cases.”27
Specifically, the Mandatory Guidelines allowed departures where
“the judge ‘finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the
guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that
described.’ ”28
Yet departures were largely unavailable: “In most cases, as
a matter of law, the Commission will have adequately taken all
relevant factors into account, and no departure will be legally
permissible. In those instances, the judge is bound to impose a

25

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233–34 (2005) (Steven, J., delivering
the opinion of the Court in part).
26
Id.
27
Id. at 234 (emphasis in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2000),
invalidated by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)).
28
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2000), invalidated by United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)).
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sentence within the Guidelines range.”29
Data from the
Commission supports this statement.30 In a period just before
the Booker decision, judges only departed from the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines .8% of the time.31 Even if a sentencing
judge were to depart from the guideline range, the sentence
would likely be reversed on appeal.32
The Supreme Court has continuously emphasized the history
and importance of judicial discretion in sentencing.33
Historically, Congress granted district courts “wide discretion in
deciding whether the defendant should be incarcerated and for
how long.”34 This broad discretion permitted district courts to
individualize offenders’ sentences by considering the facts at
hand and the history of the offender.35 The Supreme Court has
stressed the significance of discretionary sentencing, adding that
it has “never doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad
discretion in imposing a sentence within a statutory range.”36
Judicial discretion, it seems, composes an essential element of
the sentencing process. Yet discretion is exactly what the
Mandatory Guidelines stripped from district court judges.37
Second, the Mandatory Guidelines resulted in arbitrary
sentencing.38 Leading up to Booker in 2005, the Supreme Court
noticed that judges emphasized “facts that enhanced sentencing
ranges,” which “increase[d] the judge’s power and diminish[ed]
that of the jury.”39
Instead, “the judge, not the
jury, . . . determined the upper limits of sentencing, and the facts
determined were not required to be raised before trial or proved
by more than a preponderance.”40 In fact, “[a]s the enhancements
became greater, the jury’s finding of the underlying crime
became less significant. And the enhancements became very
29

Id.
See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, Chapter 3 Adjustments and
Plea/Trial Rates Pre-Booker 2005, https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/resear
ch-and-publications/federal-sentencing-statistics/guideline-application-frequencies/
2005/05_chapter3_pre.pdf.
31
Id. at 1.
32
Booker, 543 U.S. at 234–35.
33
Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 892–93 (2017).
34
Id. at 893 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989)).
35
Id.
36
Id. (quoting Booker, 543 U.S. at 233).
37
See, e.g., Booker, 543 U.S. at 233–35.
38
United States v. Parks, No. 03-CR-00490-WYD, 2017 WL 3732078, at *5 (D.
Colo. Aug. 1, 2017).
39
Booker, 543 U.S. at 236.
40
Id.
30
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serious indeed.”41 For instance, the sentencing judge in Booker
enhanced Booker’s sentence from 262 months (about twenty-two
years) to life.42
Other examples include judges increasing
defendants’ sentences from fifteen years to twenty-five years,43
from seventy-eight months (about six and a half years) to 235
months (about twenty years), from fifty-four months (about four
and a half years) to life,44 and from fifty-seven months (about five
years) to 155 years.45
Finally, there is a substantial number of defendantappellants sentenced under the Mandatory Guidelines. The
Commission conducted a study on the application of Guideline
provisions.46
From November 2004 to January 2005, the
Commission received a staggering 18,788 cases where the
Mandatory Guidelines were applied.47 Therefore, the Mandatory
Guidelines presented several problems within the criminal
sentencing system.
B. Booker: The Shockwave that Struck Criminal Sentencing
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines were mandatory before
United States v. Booker came down in 2005.48 In Booker, the
Supreme Court held that the Mandatory Guidelines were
unconstitutional, rendering them only advisory in nature.49 The
Court described how the Mandatory Guidelines fixed sentences:
“The Guidelines as written, however, are not advisory; they are
mandatory and binding on all judges . . . . Because they are
binding on judges, we have consistently held that the Guidelines
have the force and effect of laws.”50 For this reason, judges had
no discretion to order a sentence that departed from the
mandated guideline range.51
In fact, the Supreme Court
specifically noted that departures were unavailable in most cases
41

Id.
Id.
43
Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 230–31 (1999).
44
See United States v. Rodriguez, 73 F.3d 161, 163 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
45
United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 361–62 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc)
(Motz, J., dissenting).
46
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 30.
47
Id. at 1 n.1.
48
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005) (Stevens, J., opinion of the
Court).
49
Id. at 245 (Breyer, J., opinion of the Court).
50
Id. at 233–34 (Stevens, J., opinion of the Court).
51
Id.
42
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and, if given, would be legally impermissible.52 Even if a
sentencing judge departed from the Mandatory Guidelines, that
judge’s decision to depart would have been reversed.53
Ultimately, Booker held that the Mandatory Guidelines were
unconstitutional because they violate the Sixth Amendment’s
requirement that “juries, not judges . . . find facts relevant to
sentencing.”54 Thus, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are now
only advisory. It is important to remember that Booker only
came down in 2005, which means that a multitude of defendantappellants were sentenced under the Mandatory Guidelines since
1984.55 In fact, the Supreme Court has recently noted that this
precise issue “could determine the liberty of over 1,000 people.”56
C. The Aftermath of Beckles
Beckles is the most recent Supreme Court case to address the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Consequently, the importance of
Beckles has yet to be fully realized or defined. In Beckles, the
Supreme Court held that the Advisory Guidelines are not void for
vagueness under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.57 The Supreme Court explained that the twin
concerns of the vagueness doctrine, notice and arbitrary
enforcement, do not apply to the Advisory Guidelines.58 Indeed,
the Advisory Guidelines do not invoke notice concerns since they
are not mandatory, and there is no fear of arbitrary enforcement
because the Advisory Guidelines are not directly enforceable at
all.59
In particular, Beckles states that there are only two kinds of
criminal laws that can be challenged for vagueness: “laws that
define criminal offenses and laws that fix the permissible
sentences for criminal offenses.”60 As a result, one of the main
issues in Beckles was whether the Advisory Guidelines “fix the
permissible sentences for criminal offenses” so that they could be

52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Id. at 234.
Id. at 234–35.
Id. at 245 (Breyer, J., opinion of the Court).
See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 30.
Brown v. United States, 586 U.S. __ (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 890 (2017).
Id. at 894–95.
Id.
Id. at 892 (emphasis in original).
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challenged under the vagueness doctrine.61 The Supreme Court
held that the Advisory Guidelines “merely guide the exercise of a
court’s discretion.”62
The Supreme Court’s holding in Beckles addressed the
Advisory Guidelines, but it did not directly speak to the
Mandatory Guidelines.63 Yet Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence
provides a glimmer of hope for defendants sentenced under the
mandatory regime. She wrote:
The Court’s adherence to the formalistic distinction between
mandatory and advisory rules at least leaves open the question
whether defendants sentenced to terms of imprisonment before
our decision in United States v. Booker—that is, during the
period in which the Guidelines did “fix the permissible range of
sentences”—may mount vagueness attacks on their sentences.
That question is not presented by this case and I, like the
majority, take no position on its appropriate resolution.64

Although the Supreme Court addressed vagueness
challenges to the Advisory Guidelines in Beckles, the Court did
not directly address defendants sentenced under the Mandatory
Guidelines. This group of defendant-appellants uncovers a
unique angle to Johnson II’s application under Beckles, which is
whether a defendant can challenge his or her Mandatory
Guidelines sentence retroactively under Johnson II. The case
law in the short period of time since Johnson II and Beckles were
decided addresses—and dismisses—challenges to Advisory
Guidelines sentences. However, it is less clear what should
happen to petitioners challenging their Mandatory Guidelines
sentences as void for vagueness. Federal courts are divided on
this issue left open by the Supreme Court in Beckles.
II. SOLUTIONS TO THIS DEPRIVATION OF DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
Fortunately, there is relevant case law that provides
guidance on vagueness challenges. First, Johnson II’s analysis of
the ACCA demonstrates that a vagueness challenge should be
available for defendants sentenced under the identical language
of the Mandatory Guidelines’ residual clause. Second, Welch
illustrates that a vagueness challenge to the Mandatory
61

Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
63
Id. at 890.
64
Id. at 903 n.4 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (emphasis in original) (internal
citations omitted).
62
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Guidelines is workable in identical circumstances.
Third,
vagueness challenges in other areas of law provide examples of
when such challenges are not only permitted, but also successful.
The Framework from Johnson II and the ACCA

A.

Currently, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are advisory.65
Since Booker, the Supreme Court has revisited the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines several times. In 2015, the Supreme
Court held in Johnson II that the ACCA’s residual clause is void
for vagueness.66 Again, Johnson II is important because the
ACCA’s residual clause is identical to the residual clause in the
Mandatory Guidelines.
Implementation of the ACCA in
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) resulted in an enhanced sentence for a
defendant if he or she had three prior convictions that qualified
as “violent felon[ies].”67 The residual clause in § 924(e)(2)(B)
defined a violent felony to include “any felony that ‘involves
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury
to another.’ ”68 The residual clause was to be applied by first
having the court identify an “ordinary case” of the crime at hand;
then, the court would determine whether the ordinary case of
that crime would constitute a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another person.69
The Court reasoned that “[b]y combining indeterminacy
about how to measure the risk posed by a crime with
indeterminacy about how much risk it takes for the crime to
qualify as a violent felony, the residual clause produces more
unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process Clause

65

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (Breyer, J., opinion of the
Court).
66
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015).
67
Id. at 2555; Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012).
68
Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2555 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)). The full text of
the statute defined a violent felony as:
[A]ny crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, or
any act of juvenile delinquency involving the use or carrying of a firearm,
knife, or destructive device that would be punishable by imprisonment for
such term if committed by an adult, that—(i) has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of
another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 924 (e)(2)(B).
69
Moore v. United States, 871 F.3d 72, 75 (1st Cir. 2017) (citing Johnson, 135 S.
Ct. at 2557).
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tolerates.”70
The Court applied the vagueness doctrine to
invalidate the ACCA’s residual clause under the Due Process
Clause.71 The Supreme Court’s holding in Johnson II affects the
Mandatory Guidelines because the definition of “crime of
violence” in the Mandatory Guidelines is almost identical to the
definition of “violent felony” in the ACCA.72 “Recognizing this
resemblance, courts consistently have held that decisions
construing one of these phrases generally inform the construction
of the other.”73
B. Welch’s Helping Hand in Defining Johnson II’s Framework
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Welch demonstrates that
vagueness challenges to the Mandatory Guidelines can be
workable. In Welch, the Court held that Johnson II announced a
substantive rule that applies retroactively to cases on collateral
review.74 First, the Court reasoned that Johnson II undoubtedly
announced a new rule because it was not dictated by precedent.75
Second, the Court reasoned that Johnson II announced a
substantive rule because “it alters ‘the substantive reach of the
[ACCA]’ such that a defendant can no longer be sentenced as an
armed career criminal ‘based on’ the residual clause.”76 Because
Johnson II announced a substantive rule, the Court held that it
had retroactive effect in cases on collateral review.77
As a result, Welch further pushed open the door for
defendant-appellants challenging their sentences under the
Mandatory Guidelines.
After Beckles, Welch’s reasoning
facilitated void-for-vagueness challenges to the Mandatory

70

Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558.
Id. at 2562–63.
72
See Brown v. United States, 586 U.S. __ (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(explaining that the residual clause in the Mandatory Guidelines contained the
“exact same language” and was “identical” to the residual clause within the ACCA).
73
United States v. Sumrall, 690 F.3d 42, 42–43 (quoting United States v. Jonas,
689 F.3d 83, 86 (1st Cir. 2012)). See discussion infra Part III.C.
74
Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (2016). This is important since
many defendant-appellants challenge their sentences as an application for leave to
file a second or successive motion to vacate their sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
See Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2016, U.S. COURTS, http://www.us
courts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2016 (last visited Oct.
10, 2018).
75
Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1264.
76
In re Hoffner, 870 F.3d 301, 304 (3d Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting
Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1265).
77
Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1265.
71
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Guidelines.
Generally, such challenges occur under
28 U.S.C. § 2255.78 To grant a second or successive motion under
§ 2255(h)(2), the court must determine that the petition contains
(1) a new rule of constitutional law, (2) made retroactive to cases
on collateral review by the Supreme Court, (3) that was
previously unavailable.79
Usually, a petition will meet all three elements. First, the
petition will likely lean on Johnson II, which announced as a new
rule that “imposing an increased sentence under the residual
clause of the [ACCA] violates the Constitution’s guarantee of due
process” because it is void for vagueness.80 Second, the Supreme
Court held that Johnson II “announce[s] a substantive rule that
has retroactive effect in cases on collateral review.”81 Third, this
rule was likely “previously unavailable” for petitioners sentenced
before 2005 because Booker came down in 2005 and Johnson II
came down in 2016. Therefore, a court should grant a second or
successive motion under § 2255(h)(2) if the appellant relies on
Johnson II, which announced a new rule of constitutional law
applicable retroactively, and the timeline shows that this rule
was not previously available.
A successful example of a § 2255(h)(2) claim is demonstrated
by the First Circuit in Moore v. United States.82 There, the
defendant-appellant Moore sought to file a successive motion to
vacate his sentence under § 2255(h).83 The court illustrated
Moore’s § 2255(h)(2) claim:
The new rule upon which Moore’s motion relies, according to
Moore, is that announced in Johnson [II]. Johnson II declared
unconstitutionally vague the residual clause in the Armed
Career Criminal Act’s (ACCA) definition of a “violent felony.”
The Supreme Court made Johnson II retroactive to cases on
collateral review in Welch v. United States. Moore seeks to
argue in the district court that the new rule created by Johnson
II invalidates the residual clause of the career offender
guideline applied at his sentencing, which occurred before

78
79
80
81
82
83

28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2) (2012).
Id.
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015).
Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1268.
871 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 2017).
Id. at 74.
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United States v. Booker, made the guidelines advisory. For the
following reasons, we grant Moore the certification he
requests.84

Moore also instructs that if it is unclear whether the defendantappellant identified a constitutional rule applicable to his or her
situation, and “the question is close,” the circuit court should
leave the issue for the district court to resolve.85 Thus, Moore
demonstrates the legal argument defendant-appellants formulate
when challenging their sentences under § 2255(h).86
Alternatively, defendant-appellants may also challenge their
Mandatory Guidelines sentences under § 2255(f)(3). Because the
statute of limitations would often prohibit a defendant sentenced
under the Mandatory Guidelines before 2005 from bringing such
a challenge, defendant-appellants often use this section of the
statute to bring their claim. Section 2255(f)(3) states that there
is a one-year statute of limitations for attacking a sentence, and
that this limitation period shall run from “the date on which the
right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if
that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and
made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.”87
Thus, under § 2255(h)(2) or § 2255(f)(3), defendantappellants must show that the Supreme Court has recognized a
new rule or right. For the same reasons discussed above,
defendant-appellants should succeed on their § 2255(f)(3)
motions because they are asserting the exact same right recently
recognized in Johnson II.88 Therefore, vagueness challenges to
the Mandatory Guidelines are workable, and § 2255 can be the
vehicle for defendant-appellants to challenge their Mandatory
Guidelines sentences.
C. The Vagueness Doctrine and the Path of Other Vagueness
Challenges
1.

Background on the Vagueness Doctrine

Defendant-appellants challenge their Mandatory Guidelines
sentences under the vagueness doctrine. The vagueness doctrine
is derived from the Supreme Court’s understanding that the Due
84
85
86
87
88

Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 80.
See, e.g., Remington v. United States, 872 F.3d 72, 75–76 (1st Cir. 2017).
28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) (2012).
See infra Part III.C.
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Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment “prohibits the
Government from ‘taking away someone’s life, liberty, or
property under a criminal law so vague that it fails to give
ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or so
standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement.’ ”89 Although
limited in scope, the vagueness doctrine addresses two
constitutional concerns: “providing notice and preventing
arbitrary enforcement.”90
The vagueness doctrine requires
clarity to defend the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process protections;
therefore, laws that are impermissibly vague must be
invalidated.91 Importantly, “a regulation is not vague because it
may at times be difficult to prove an incriminating fact but
rather because it is unclear as to what fact must be proved.”92
The Supreme Court “invalidated two kinds of criminal laws
as ‘void for vagueness’: laws that define criminal offenses and
laws that fix the permissible sentences for criminal offenses.”93
First, the vagueness doctrine “requires that a penal statute
define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and
in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.”94 Second, the vagueness doctrine
requires that “statutes fixing sentences must specify the range of
available sentences with ‘sufficient clarity.’ ”95 Normally, a
person who engages in conduct that is “clearly proscribed cannot
complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of
others.”96
Although the vagueness doctrine addresses these twin
concerns, there is also a third aspect of the vagueness doctrine:
“the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines

89

Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 892 (2017) (quoting Johnson v.
United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 (2015)); see United States v. Williams, 553 U.S.
285, 304 (2008).
90
Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 894; see also F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567
U.S. 239, 253 (2012).
91
Fox Television Stations, 567 U.S. at 253.
92
Id.; see, e.g., Williams, 553 U.S. at 306 (“Thus, we have struck down statutes
that tied criminal culpability to whether the defendant's conduct was ‘annoying’ or
‘indecent’—wholly subjective judgments without statutory definitions, narrowing
context, or settled legal meanings.”).
93
Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 892 (emphasis in original).
94
Id. (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)).
95
Id. (internal citations omitted) (citing United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S.
114, 123 (1979)).
96
Williams, 553 U.S. at 304.
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to govern law enforcement.”97 Without this requirement, “a
criminal statute may permit ‘a standardless sweep [that] allows
policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal
predilections.’ ”98 The vagueness doctrine provides a basis for
appellants to challenge their convictions for various crimes and
sentences.
2.

Examples of Vagueness Challenges

Other cases with vagueness challenges illustrate how such a
challenge is brought and addressed. For instance, in Coates v.
City of Cincinnati, the Supreme Court invalidated an ordinance
that criminalized the assembly of people on a sidewalk if done in
an “annoying” manner.99 The Supreme Court held that this
ordinance was unconstitutional, in part, because it violated “the
due process standard of vagueness.”100 The Court reasoned that
this ordinance was “unconstitutionally vague because it subjects
the exercise of the right of assembly to an unascertainable
standard, and unconstitutionally broad because it authorizes the
punishment of constitutionally protected conduct.”101 Moreover,
the Court stated that the ordinance was vague because “no
standard of conduct is specified at all. As a result, ‘men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.’ ”102
Similarly, in City of Chicago v. Morales, the Supreme Court
held that Chicago’s Gang Congregation Ordinance was
unconstitutionally vague.103 This ordinance made it a crime for
people to disobey a police officer’s order to disperse and leave an
area after the police officer, who reasonably believed that these
people were gang members, thought they were remaining in one
place with no apparent reason.104 Notably, any person who
disobeyed the police officer’s order violated this ordinance,

97

Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 (1983) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574
(1974)).
98
Id. (alteration in original) (citing Smith, 415 U.S. at 575).
99
402 U.S. 611, 613 (1971).
100
Id. at 615.
101
Id. at 614.
102
Id. (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926))
(explaining that although the ordinance encompassed conduct the city could
constitutionally prohibit, the city must enact and enforce ordinances “with
reasonable specificity toward the conduct to be prohibited” and not “whether or not a
policeman is annoyed”).
103
527 U.S. 41, 45–46, 51 (1999).
104
Id. at 47.
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whether or not he or she was actually a gang member.105 Echoing
the reasoning in Coates, the Court stated that an ordinance could
be impermissibly vague if it does not establish standards to
protect against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty.106 The Court
reasoned that a facial challenge was appropriate because of the
vagueness of this ordinance; specifically, the ordinance infringed
on constitutionally protected rights and contained no mens rea
requirement.107
The Supreme Court also addressed the vagueness doctrine in
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project.108 There, the plaintiffs
brought a void-for-vagueness challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 2339B,
which made it a federal crime to “knowingly provid[e] material
support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization.”109
Ultimately, the Court held that the plaintiffs’ vagueness
challenge lacked merit and thus must fail.110 The Court noted
that a vagueness challenge under the Fifth Amendment does not
need to involve a substantial amount of protected expression.111
However, the plaintiffs there did not argue that the statute
permitted too much enforcement discretion for the
Government.112
Drawing a distinction, the Court in Holder reflected on past
cases that applied the vagueness doctrine—cases involving
“wholly subjective judgments without statutory definitions,
narrowing context, or settled legal meanings.”113 Yet in Holder,
the statutory terms of “training,” “expert advice or assistance,”
“service,” and “personnel” did not require “untethered, subjective
judgments.”114 Furthermore, the Court noted that Congress
narrowed the definitions of the statutes over time and also
included a knowledge requirement in the statute.115 Finally, the
Court stressed that the vagueness challenge must fail because
the statutory terms clearly proscribed the plaintiff’s conduct.116
105

Id.
Id. at 52 (citing Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358).
107
Id. at 55 (“When vagueness permeates the text of such a law, it is subject to
facial attack.”).
108
561 U.S. 1 (2010).
109
Id. at 8 (alteration in original).
110
Id. at 20–21.
111
Id. at 20.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 20–21.
115
Id. at 21.
116
Id.
106
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In summary, these vagueness cases illustrate that a statute
is unconstitutionally vague when it proscribes conduct with an
unascertainable standard or with no standard of conduct
specified at all.
Without such standards defined, wholly
subjective statutory definitions lead to the arbitrary deprivation
of liberty. These cases demonstrate that the twin concerns
underlying the vagueness doctrine, notice and arbitrary
enforcement, can lead a court to render a statute
unconstitutionally vague.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL NEED TO ALLOW VAGUENESS
CHALLENGES TO THE MANDATORY GUIDELINES POST-BECKLES
Since the Supreme Court decided Beckles in 2017, defendantappellants have flooded the lower federal courts with claims
arising from this case. The Court in Beckles held that the
Advisory Guidelines were not void for vagueness,117 but it did not
decide whether individuals sentenced under the Mandatory
Guidelines could successfully raise vagueness challenges.118 The
cases stemming from Beckles are divided on whether the
Mandatory Guidelines can be challenged as void for vagueness.
Yet there are four strong arguments that demonstrate such
challenges should be permitted. This Note argues that the
Mandatory Guidelines should be vulnerable to vagueness
challenges because (1) the Mandatory Guidelines implicate
vagueness due process concerns; (2) Johnson II and Beckles
permit vagueness challenges to the Mandatory Guidelines;
(3) the ACCA and the Mandatory Guidelines should be treated
identically; and (4) the Supreme Court has recognized a new rule
applicable to the Mandatory Guidelines. The lower federal courts
are divided, and “[t]his important question . . . calls out for an
answer.”119 Thus, the Supreme Court should definitively hold
that the residual clause of the Mandatory Guidelines is subject to
vagueness challenges.

117
118
119

Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 892 (2017).
Id. at 903 n.4 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
United States v. Brown, 586 U.S.__ (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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A. The Mandatory Guidelines Implicate Vagueness Due Process
Concerns
The Mandatory Guidelines should be subject to vagueness
challenges because they implicate the due process concerns
underlying the vagueness doctrine.120 In United States v. Parks,
the District Court of Colorado held exactly that, specifically
stating that the Mandatory Guidelines did not provide notice or
prevent arbitrary enforcement.121 First, the court held that the
Mandatory Guidelines did not provide notice because “when a
judge found that the [M]andatory Guidelines’ residual clause
applied, that finding increased a defendant’s sentence above the
maximum lawful sentence to which the defendant would be
exposed without the finding.”122 Second, the court held that the
Mandatory Guidelines invited arbitrary enforcement because
they had to be enforced by the courts, with rare exceptions, and it
was unclear whether the offender would face “a significant
enhancement under the language of the clause.”123
Chief Judge Roger Gregory’s dissent in United States v.
Brown from the Fourth Circuit agreed that the Mandatory
Guidelines did not provide notice and invited arbitrary
enforcement.124 Citing both Johnson II and Welch, Chief Judge
Gregory reasoned that “a defendant’s due process rights are
violated when a court, using the categorical approach, fixes that
defendant’s sentence based on a statute that fails to provide
proper notice of what constitutes criminal conduct and requires
courts to apply imprecise and indeterminate standards.”125
Similarly, in Cross v. United States, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that the residual clause of the Mandatory Guidelines
implicated the twin concerns of the vagueness doctrine because it
“impeded a person’s efforts to ‘regulate his conduct so as to avoid
particular penalties’ and left it to the judge to ‘prescribe
the . . . sentencing range available.’ ”126

120

United States v. Parks, No. 03-CR-00490-WYD, 2017 WL 3732078, at *4 (D.
Colo. Aug. 1, 2017).
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id. at *5.
124
868 F.3d 297, 307–08 (4th Cir. 2017) (Gregory, C.J., dissenting).
125
Id.
126
892 F.3d 288, 306 (7th Cir. 2018) (alteration in original) (quoting Beckles v.
United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 894–95 (2017)).
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Additionally, the First Circuit in Moore v. United States gave
the district court discretion to decide whether the Mandatory
Guidelines were void for vagueness because the defendant did
not qualify for a departure at sentencing.127 Months later, the
District Court of Massachusetts explicitly stated that the
Mandatory Guidelines were vulnerable to vagueness challenges
because they were binding on judges.128
Therefore, the
Mandatory Guidelines should be subject to vagueness challenges
because they implicate the two foundational concerns underlying
the vagueness doctrine: providing notice and preventing
arbitrary enforcement by judges.129
B. Johnson II and Beckles Permit Vagueness Challenges to the
Mandatory Guidelines
Beckles also triggered a series of cases that discussed
whether Johnson II and Beckles permit vagueness challenges to
the Mandatory Guidelines. Although the Advisory Guidelines
are not vulnerable to vagueness challenges, the Mandatory
Guidelines “are not immune from constitutional scrutiny under
other due process challenges, the Ex Post Facto clause, or the
Eighth Amendment.”130 The Supreme Court held in Johnson II
that the ACCA’s residual clause, which is identical to the
residual clause of the Mandatory Guidelines, is void for
vagueness.131 In Beckles, the Court held that the Advisory
Guidelines were not vulnerable to vagueness challenges,132
leaving open whether individuals sentenced under the
Mandatory Guidelines could bring vagueness challenges.133
Under the reasoning and holdings in both Johnson II and
Beckles, the Court should permit vagueness challenges to the
Mandatory Guidelines.

127

871 F.3d 72, 84 (1st Cir. 2017).
United States v. Roy, 282 F. Supp. 3d 421, 427 (D. Mass. 2017) (“The
reasoning in Beckles depends on the advisory status of the Guidelines post-Booker
and, as such, did not preclude vagueness challenges to the career offender provision
as applied pre-Booker.”).
129
Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 894 (2017); see also F.C.C. v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253–54 (2012).
130
Wilson F. Green & Marc A. Starrett, The Appellate Corner, 78 ALA. LAW. 224,
232 (2017).
131
See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015).
132
Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 892.
133
Id. at 903 n. 4 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
128
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In Moore, the First Circuit agreed.134 The First Circuit
stated that “Beckles did not limit Johnson II to its facts. Rather,
one can fairly and easily read Beckles as simply rejecting the
application of the rule of Johnson II to the [A]dvisory
[G]uidelines because, as a matter of statutory interpretation,
those guidelines do not fix sentences.”135 The First Circuit
further reasoned that Beckles left open the issue of the
Mandatory Guidelines; consequently, the court acknowledged
that the defendant was asserting the same right recognized by
Johnson II.136 Thus, a petitioner should be able to successfully
challenge his or her Mandatory Guidelines sentence as vague
because Johnson II recognized this exact right.
Similarly, in United States v. Roy, the District Court of
Massachusetts held that “Beckles does not preclude application of
Johnson II to the residual clause of the career offender
guideline . . . .”137 The court reasoned that vagueness challenges
to the Mandatory Guidelines were not precluded under Beckles
because the Supreme Court based its decision on the advisory
nature of the current Federal Sentencing Guidelines.138
In addition, the Second Circuit stated that “Beckles did not
clearly foreclose the argument” that the Mandatory Guidelines
are vulnerable to vagueness challenges.139 In Parks, the District
Court of Colorado repeated this assertion.140 That court explicitly
agreed that Beckles did not foreclose relief for a defendant
sentenced under the Mandatory Guidelines.141 Even more, that
court held that the defendant was entitled to relief under
Johnson II.142
Accordingly, Beckles should not prohibit a
Mandatory Guidelines petitioner from bringing a vagueness
claim, and Johnson II should provide relief to such petitioners.
Although several courts decided that Johnson II and Beckles
do not apply to the Mandatory Guidelines, those courts applied
flawed reasoning.143 In Davis v. United States, the Eastern
134

871 F.3d 72, 83 (1st Cir. 2017).
Id.
136
Id.
137
282 F. Supp. 3d 421, 427 (D. Mass. 2017).
138
Id.
139
Vargas v. United States, No. 16–2112 (L), 2017 WL 3699225, at *1 (2d Cir.
May 8, 2017).
140
No. 03-CR-00490-WYD, 2017 WL 3732078, at *7, *13 (D. Colo. Aug. 1, 2017).
141
Id.
142
Id. at *13.
143
Some district courts have reiterated the opinion that Johnson II solely
applied to the ACCA and that Beckles intentionally avoids addressing the vagueness
135
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District of Wisconsin held that Beckles demonstrated that
Johnson II’s rationale does not apply to the Mandatory
Guidelines.144 The court continued to find that Johnson II’s
holding should exclude the expectation of defendants “to be free
from a sentence arguably impacted by vague sentencing
guidelines.”145 Yet this line of reasoning is inherently flawed:
The Fifth Amendment expressly “prohibits the Government from
‘taking away someone’s life, liberty, or property under a criminal
law so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the
conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary
enforcement.’ ”146
Consequently, on appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed and
remanded the district court’s opinion in Davis. Citing Beckles,
the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the Mandatory Guidelines
were vulnerable to vagueness challenges because they “impeded
a person’s efforts to ‘regulate his conduct so as to avoid particular
penalties’ and left it to the judge to ‘prescribe the . . . sentencing
range available.’ ”147 Further, the Seventh Circuit stated that
Johnson II retroactively applies to the Mandatory Guidelines and
provides relief to defendant-appellants sentenced under the
Mandatory Guidelines.148
Defendants should be free from a sentence affected by vague
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. In fact, the Supreme Court has
held that impermissibly vague laws must be invalidated.149 The
heart of the vagueness doctrine requires that criminal statutes
be defined with sufficient definiteness and clarity.150 Even more,
the Court in Johnson II notes that “[t]he prohibition of vagueness
in criminal statutes ‘is a well-recognized requirement, consonant

doctrine with respect to the Mandatory Guidelines; thus, these courts assert that
Johnson II and Beckles do not permit vagueness challenges to the Mandatory
Guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Baldwin, No. CR 00–105, 2017 WL 3730503, at
*3 (E.D. La. Aug. 30, 2017); Mitchell v. United States, No. 3:00-CR-00014, 2017 WL
2275092, at *4 (W.D. Va. May 24, 2017).
144
No. 16-C-747, 2017 WL 3129791, at *5 (E.D. Wis. July 21, 2017), rev’d and
remanded by Cross v. United States, 892 F.3d 288 (7th Cir. 2018).
145
Id.
146
Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 892 (2017) (quoting Johnson v.
United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 (2015)); see United States v. Williams, 553 U.S.
285, 304 (2008).
147
Cross v. United States, 892 F.3d 288, 306 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Beckles,
137 S. Ct. at 894–95).
148
Id. at 307.
149
F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012).
150
Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 892.
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alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of
law,’ and a statute that flouts it ‘violates the first essential of due
process.’ ”151 Therefore, any case law claiming the opposite is
relying on unconstitutional principles.
On that same note, the Fourth Circuit in United States v.
Brown contended that Beckles established that Johnson II’s
rationale could not be applied to similar residual clauses because
the Supreme Court’s “carefully crafted” holding only addressed
the Advisory Guidelines.152 However, Chief Judge Gregory’s
dissent in Brown is more persuasive. Chief Judge Gregory
maintains that “Beckles and Booker merely reinforce that the
right newly recognized in Johnson [II] is indeed applicable to [the
defendant’s] claim.”153 He reasoned that Beckles only excluded
the advisory sentencing provisions from Johnson II’s holding, but
it “did not disturb Johnson[II]’s holding that where a vague
sentencing provision operates to fix a defendant’s sentence under
the categorical approach, it is susceptible to attack under the
Due Process Clause.”154 The dissent summarized that Beckles
“[shrunk] the universe of sentencing provisions susceptible to
attack on vagueness grounds [and] reinforced that a defendant
has the due process right—as newly recognized in Johnson [II]—
not to have his sentence fixed by the application of the
categorical approach to an imprecise and indeterminate
sentencing provision.”155
In short, the Supreme Court’s holding in Beckles permits
petitioners sentenced under the Mandatory Guidelines to bring
vagueness claims under Johnson II’s new rule. Although the
courts are somewhat split on whether Johnson II and Beckles
allow vagueness challenges to the Mandatory Guidelines, the
more persuasive case law explains that such challenges should be
permitted under Johnson II, Beckles, and the Due Process
Clause.

151
Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556–57 (2015) (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co.,
269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
152
868 F.3d 297, 302–03 (4th Cir. 2017).
153
Id. at 310 (Gregory, C.J., dissenting).
154
Id. at 308 (emphasis omitted).
155
Id.

2018]

PROTECTING THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

631

C. The Supreme Court’s Treatment of the ACCA Further
Supports that the Mandatory Guidelines Should Be
Vulnerable to Vagueness Challenges
The Supreme Court’s treatment of the ACCA in Johnson II
provides additional support for the proposition that void-forvagueness challenges should be allowed under the Mandatory
Guidelines. In Johnson II, the Supreme Court held that the
ACCA’s residual clause, which is identical to the residual clause
of the Mandatory Guidelines, is void for vagueness.156 With such
exact similarities, it logically follows that the ACCA and the
Mandatory Guidelines should be treated in the same manner.157
In fact, “[r]ecognizing this resemblance, courts consistently have
held that decisions construing one of these phrases generally
inform the construction of the other.”158
The First Circuit explicitly held that “Beckles did not limit
Johnson II to its facts.”159 Following this precedent, the District
Court of Massachusetts maintained that “a straightforward
application of Johnson II” to the Mandatory Guidelines is
appropriate because the Mandatory Guidelines’ residual clause
tracks the residual clause of the ACCA.160 Furthermore, the
District Court of Massachusetts declared that in Moore, the First
Circuit rejected the reasoning of the Fourth and Sixth Circuits
that Johnson II only applies to the ACCA.161
In United States v. Costello, the Southern District of Ohio
applied the vagueness doctrine to a defendant sentenced under
the Mandatory Guidelines because under those guidelines, “the
residual clause of the Guideline Career Offender requirement,
which is textually the same as the clause declared
unconstitutionally
vague
in
Johnson
[II],
is
also
unconstitutionally vague.”162 The District Court of Colorado
echoed this reasoning in Parks by drawing parallels between the
156

Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2563.
United States v. Sumrall, 690 F.3d 42, 42–43. See also Brown v. United States,
586 U.S. __ (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“You might think that if a sequence of
words that increases a person’s time in prison is unconstitutionally vague in one
legally binding provision, that same sequence is unconstitutionally vague if it serves
the same purpose in another legally binding provision.”).
158
Id. (quoting United States v. Jonas, 689 F.3d 83, 86 (1st Cir. 2012)).
159
United States v. Roy, 282 F. Supp. 3d 421, 428 (D. Mass. 2017) (quoting
Moore v. United States, 871 F.3d 72, 83 (1st Cir. 2017)).
160
Id. (quoting Moore, 871 F.3d at 82).
161
Id.; Moore, 871 F.3d at 83.
162
No. 1:02-CR-089, 2017 WL 2666410, at *2 (S.D. Ohio June 21, 2017)
(emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
157
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Mandatory Guidelines and the ACCA.163 The court noted that
just as a sentencing judge was constrained under the ACCA, the
sentencing judge in that case was legally bound to impose a
sentence within the Mandatory Guidelines range.164 Further, the
court stated that the Mandatory Guidelines implicate the same
due process concerns as the ACCA had.165 The court observed
that the residual clause in both the Mandatory Guidelines and
the ACCA deprived the defendant of notice because it drove a
defendant’s sentence above the maximum lawful sentence
otherwise applicable.166 Additionally, the language in both
residual clauses made it unclear whether the defendant risked a
significant enhancement under the clause, which could implicate
arbitrary enforcement by judges.167 From these cases, the
Mandatory Guidelines clearly implicate the dual concerns
underlying the vagueness doctrine, just as the ACCA had.
Chief Judge Gregory’s dissent in Brown reiterated that the
Mandatory Guidelines should be treated the same way as the
ACCA was because of the identical language of the residual
clauses and due process concerns.168 He explained that “the
residual clause at issue here . . . contained in the Mandatory
Sentencing Guidelines, rather than the ACCA, is a distinction
without a difference” because the “clauses’ text is identical, and
courts applied them using the same categorical approach and for
the same ends—to fix a defendant’s sentence.”169 Therefore,
Chief Judge Gregory argued that Johnson II’s new right is
applicable to a defendant sentenced under the Mandatory
Guidelines because the “residual clause presents the same
problems of notice and arbitrary enforcement as the ACCA’s
residual clause at issue in Johnson [II].”170
Because the
Mandatory Guidelines invoke the same due process concerns as
the ACCA, both residual clauses should be treated the same way.

163
See United States v. Parks, No. 03-CR-00490-WYD, 2017 WL 3732078, at *5
(D. Colo. Aug. 1, 2017).
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id. (citing Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015)).
168
United States v. Brown, 868 F.3d 297, 310 (4th Cir. 2017) (Gregory, J.,
dissenting).
169
Id.
170
Id.
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There is a dearth of case law opposing the above cases on
this point, and the courts that do come out on the other side of
this particular issue do not provide any effective reasoning. For
example, the Western District of Virginia, without explanation,
claimed that it is “clear” that Johnson II’s holding only applied to
the ACCA and did not extend to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines.171 But such conclusory judgments cannot be upheld
when constitutional rights are involved. Few courts support this
incomplete finding, but, interestingly, those that do also concede
that the text of the residual clauses in the ACCA and Mandatory
Guidelines are “identically worded.”172 Although these cases
claim that there are “fundamental difference[s]” between the two
residual clauses, they do not detail these differences or the effects
of these alleged differences.173 As a result, this argument is
without merit. The identical residual clauses within the ACCA
and the Mandatory Guidelines should be treated in the same
manner, and defendant-appellants should be able to challenge
their Mandatory Guidelines sentences as void for vagueness.
D. The Supreme Court Has Recognized a New Rule in Johnson
II that Is Applicable to the Mandatory Guidelines
Any argument contending that statutory and constitutional
interpretations do not permit vagueness challenges to the
Mandatory Guidelines is meritless. This argument contends that
because only the Supreme Court can announce a new rule that is
retroactive on collateral review, and the Supreme Court has not
explicitly announced a rule applying to the Mandatory
Guidelines under Johnson II, no new rule has been announced
and therefore cannot be applied to the Mandatory Guidelines.
Both the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have maintained this
position, claiming that because Beckles left open the question
whether the Mandatory Guidelines can be void for vagueness,
that open question cannot comprise a right recognized by the
Supreme Court.174 Other district courts have agreed, reasoning
171
Mitchell v. United States, No. 3:00-CR-00014, 2017 WL 2275092, at *4 (W.D.
Va. May 24, 2017).
172
Brown, 868 F.3d at 302 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Beckles v.
United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 890 (2017)).

173
Id.; United States v. Hurlburt, 835 F.3d 715, 726 (7th Cir. 2016) (Hamilton,
J., dissenting), abrogated by Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017).
174
Brown, 868 F.3d at 301; Raybon v. United States, 867 F.3d 625, 630 (6th Cir.
2017).
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that defendant-appellants making this argument are asking
courts to “extend” Johnson II’s holding to the Mandatory
Guidelines.175 These courts state that this would allow the lower
federal courts to make a new rule, which is only within the
Supreme Court’s power.176 Yet even within those district courts,
judges have granted a certificate of appealability on this issue.177
Nevertheless, federal courts should apply the vagueness
doctrine to the Mandatory Guidelines under Johnson II and
Beckles because doing so would not create a new rule of
constitutional law.178 The Supreme Court in Chaidez v. United
States specifically held that “a case does not announce a new
rule, [when] it [is] merely an application of the principle that
governed a prior decision to a different set of facts.”179 Thus, a
lower federal court that applies Johnson II’s holding to the
Mandatory Guidelines would not be announcing a new rule;
rather, it would be applying Johnson II’s principle to the
analogous cases of Mandatory Guidelines petitioners.
For example, the First Circuit in Moore reasoned that “one
can fairly and easily read Beckles as simply rejecting the
application of the rule of Johnson II to the Advisory Guidelines
because, as a matter of statutory interpretation, those guidelines
do not fix sentences.”180 The court continued, “[w]hat Beckles left
open, then, was a question of statutory interpretation concerning
how mandatory the [Federal Sentencing Guidelines were] before
Booker.”181
Consequently, the First Circuit held that the
defendant sought to assert the right exactly recognized by
Johnson II.182
175
United States v. Kenney, No. 1:92-CR-22, 2017 WL 3602038, at *3 (M.D. Pa.
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Likewise, the District Court of Massachusetts reasoned that
“the task at hand is not fashioning a new rule of constitutional
law, but rather simply interpreting a statute.”183 Importantly,
the court noted that the Mandatory Guidelines were binding on
judges, which made them “vulnerable to vagueness challenges
under the rule adopted in Johnson II.”184 Applying Johnson II’s
holding to the Mandatory Guidelines would therefore not be
announcing a new rule; instead, it would be applying Johnson
II’s rule to analogous facts through statutory interpretation.
Vagueness challenges to the Mandatory Guidelines should thus
be permitted.
CONCLUSION
Criminal defendants sentenced under the Mandatory
Guidelines should not be left without a path to challenge the
unconstitutional vagueness of their sentences. Multitudes of
defendants have been sentenced under the constitutionally
problematic Mandatory Guidelines. Specifically, the Mandatory
Guidelines invoke the twin concerns of the vagueness doctrine:
to protect individuals from lack of notice and from arbitrary
enforcement by judges. The Mandatory Guidelines are thus
infringing on individuals’ constitutional rights. Johnson II and
Beckles permit such vagueness challenges for individuals
sentenced under the Mandatory Guidelines; the ACCA’s residual
clause is identical to that of the Mandatory Guidelines, and the
new rule announced in Johnson II is applicable to the Mandatory
Guidelines. Thus, such challenges are workable under the
framework of both Johnson II and Welch.
Vagueness challenges to the Mandatory Guidelines will
provide various benefits. First, such challenges bring practical
value. Definitively stating that the Mandatory Guidelines are
amenable to vagueness challenges will reduce the eruption of
litigation in lower federal courts surrounding such challenges.
This solution will alleviate administrative concerns. Second,
permitting vagueness challenges to the Mandatory Guidelines
will finally close the chapter of ambiguity in federal sentencing.
This will be the final step in moving away from the
unconstitutionality of the Mandatory Guidelines and the
vagueness due process concerns implicated by this sentencing
183
184
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regime. To not address this imminent question in the affirmative
will jeopardize the constitutional rights of many defendantappellants.
The Supreme Court must answer this “important question of
federal law that has divided the courts of appeals.”185 The
“liberty of over 1,000 people” is at stake.186 As Justice Sotomayor
articulated, “[t]hat sounds like the kind of case [the Supreme
Court] ought to hear.”187 Therefore, the Supreme Court should
hear a case on this important issue and hold that the Mandatory
Guidelines are amenable to vagueness challenges.
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